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Based on a new economic geography model and gravity theory, this article analyzes FDI 
determinants in the CEECs and competition effects in terms of inward FDIs under increasing 
economic integration. Applying different econometric techniques (fixed effects, PQML), the 
results show that market potential and communications infrastructure are more important 
FDI determinants than wages in the CEECs. Also, they confirm competition effects triggered 
by Chinese and Southern Europe relative communication costs. We find weak evidence for 




Recent  developments  in  economic  modelling  allowed  a  deeper  understanding  of  different 
channels of international economic integration and their effects on local economic activity 
and welfare in general. 
Fujita and Thisse (2006) and Vechiu (2010) present theoretical models combining new 
economic  geography  and  multinational  production  organization  aspects,  which  allow 
assessing  the  impact  of  different  kinds  of  economic  integration  (trade  liberalization  and 
technology  diffusion)  of  industry  relocation  and  welfare  and  also  of  third  countries 
competition effects. The models highlighted two essential aspects. Firstly, labour costs and 
penetration of the new information and communications technologies (NICT) in developing 
countries  may  jointly  determine  FDI  flows  towards  developing  countries:  too  high 
communication costs may offset the advantage of low labour costs and thus hinder FDIs or 
low enough labour costs may offset the disadvantage of high communication costs and thus 
favour  FDIs  (Fujita  and  Thisse,  2006).  Secondly,  with  globalization  multiplying  location 
choices for firms, it appears what Baldwin et al. (1996) called investment diversion, implying 
competition effects between destination countries in order to attract FDIs (Vechiu, 2010).   2 
Under these circumstances, the CEECs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia)  represent  a  very  interesting  case 
study for these questions: since the beginning of the 1990s, they have continuously strengthen 
their economic ties with the rest of the world and especially, with the European Union, of 
which they became members in 2007, for Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2004, for the eight 
others. We will see thereafter that their wage differential with investing developed countries 
and also with other developing countries is quite attractive for companies seeking to minimize 
their production costs. At the same time, their communications infrastructures continue to 
improve,  thus  further  attracting  FDIs.  If  we  think  of  the  multilateral  trade  liberalization 
analyzed  within  the  framework  of  our  theoretical  model  (Vechiu,  2010),  the  increasing 
competitiveness of the CEECs can affect the attractiveness of other challenging countries, 
such  as  Portugal,  the  Mediterranean  countries  or  China.  Consequently,  this  article  will 
empirically  assess  the  importance  of  FDIs  towards  the  CEECs,  the  analysis  being  based 
primarily on the theoretical model mentioned above and some considerations of the gravity 
theory. 
In the next section, we will present previous work on FDI determinants and investment 
diversion as well as some stylized facts about the CEECs, our period of interest being 1996-
2003. Section II will briefly survey the theoretical model and its main results, while section 
III will analyze FDI determinants and some possible competition effects between the CEECs 
and two other chosen destinations in terms of attracting FDIs. Section IV concludes. 
 




In the economic literature concerning developing countries in general, but also the CEECs in 
particular, FDI determinants have been largely analyzed and it has already been highlighted 
the importance of labour costs for vertical FDIs (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Nunnenkamp, 2002; 
Dunning, 2002; Lansbury et al., 1996; Altomonte, 2000). 
Nunnenkamp (2002) shows that even if the traditional market factors remain prevalent, 
the labour costs still have an important influence on FDI decisions, whereas Dunning (2002) 
finds that FDIs in developing countries have rather vertical motivations (the labour costs 
would be the main determinants) than market related or resources-seeking motivations. By 
using  simple  econometric  techniques  for  panels,  Nonnemberg  and  Mendoça  (2004)  study   3 
traditional determinants such as GDP, trade openess, risk, inflation, growth rate, the stock 
index Dow Jones, human capital, most of them turning out significant in all the econometric 
models used (OLS, fixed and random effects models). 
Authors  who  tried  to  estimate  theoretical  models  drawn  from  the  theory  of 
multinationals  firms  (MNF),  such  as  the  KK  (Knowledge  Capital)  model  or  Markusen’s 
(1995) model, bring evidence for a horizontal multinational activity rather than vertical (Carr 
et al., 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 1999, 2002; Brainard, 1997). On the other hand, instead 
of using FDIs as a measure for multinational activity, as it is largely done in the literature, 
they use the sales of the subsidiary companies established abroad. M. Chen (2009) gives 
examples of multinationals (GM and Philips) and statistics (EU) which show that the creation 
of an FTA (free trade agreement), for example, involves FDI creation inside the FTA, but also 
FDI diversion between the members of the FTA. With simple techniques such as OLS, but 
also  more  sophisticated  one  such  as  instrumental  variables  and  Poisson  Quasi  Maximum 
Likelihood  (PQML),  the  author  finds  indeed,  that  the  creation  of  an  FTA  triggers  FDIs 
towards  the  FTA,  but  asymmetrically  assigned  inside  the  agreement:  the  members  with 
abundant labour force attract more labour intensive FDIs, whereas the members with mainly 
capital endowments attract less this type of FDIs. Barrell and Pain (1999) also prove that 
completely removing barriers to trade in the EU triggered increasing FDIs in six European 
countries  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  United  Kingdom).  They 
empirically  analyze  FDIs  of  US  multinationals  in  these  countries  and  introduce  in  their 
estimations a dummy variable to assess the impact of the creation of the Single European 
Market in 1989. 
Many studies are based on gravity theory and thus, use as determinants for FDIs the 
GDP of the investing country and that of the destination country as well as the distance that 
separates them. Braconier et al. (2005) study vertical and horizontal FDIs and use the market 
access built by Redding and Venables (2004) rather than distance and GDPs. They find a 
significant impact of absolute labour costs and also of skilled/unskilled relative labour costs. 
Disdier  and  Mayer  (2004)  use  a  conditional  logit  and  nested  logit  model  to  study  the 
determinants  of  the  FDIs  in  the  CEECs.  More  precisely,  they  verify  if  French  investors 
consider the CEECs differently from the countries of Western Europe. Their results confirm 
this assumption, but it appears that as European integration proceeds, the assumption loses its 
strength. Finally, the competition effect in terms of attracting FDIs seems to appear mostly 
between the countries belonging to the same group (CEECs or Western Europe) rather than   4 
between countries belonging to different groups, the CEECs becoming more and more close 
substitutes for the Western European countries. 
Altomonte (2000) identifies three stylized facts concerning the activity of the MNFs in 
the CEECs: (1) FDIs in the CEECs reflect the various strategies of MNFs; (2) reform timing 
is very important; (3) geographical proximity is also very important for FDIs coming from 
Western Europe. Concerning the strategies of the MNFs, 43% of the FDIs are horizontal 
(FDIs  in  sectors  with  high  scale  economies),  43%  are  vertical  (FDIs  in  labour  intensive 
sectors) and only 14% are in high technology sectors; in services (35% of FDIs), FDIs are 
mainly  in  the  telecommunications  and  energy  distribution  sectors.  Then,  such  as  already 
highlighted in other articles (e.g. Pennings and Altomonte, 2006; Holland and Pain, 1998; 
Carstensen and Toubal, 2004), countries where privatization was conducted more quickly 
received  more  FDIs.  Finally,  according  to  proximity  to  Western  Europe  countries,  FDI 
clusters were formed: Germany in Central Europe, Sweden in the Baltic States, Italy in the 
Balkans.  In  his  econometric  study,  this  author  also  finds  a  significant  impact  of  some 
traditional variables such as population, GDP per capita, wage differential, quality of the 
institutions,  but  not  for  others,  such  as  distance,  the  legal  framework,  macroeconomic 
volatility and the size of the subsidiary companies. 
Most empirical works thus confirm the importance of the traditional factors such as the 
GDP,  the  GDP  per  capita,  the  population,  the  unemployment  rate,  the  quality  of  the 
institutions, but also of variables resulting from the new economic geography or international 
trade theory, such as relative factor endowments or relative costs, scale economies, trade 
costs, distance. 
The diversion phenomenon was initially mentioned regarding trade: the creation of a 
free trade agreement or a customs union may bring the replacement of old trade links with 
countries remained outside the agreement by trade links with the member states. But trade 
diversion (Viner, 1950) or investment diversion (Baldwin et al., 1996) can also appear as a 
result of the relative competitiveness of countries taking part in preferential or multilateral 
liberalization: integration in a customs union of new countries more competitive than the 
former members can divert trade flows from the former members towards the new ones. 
Regarding  the  EU,  Boeri  and  Brücker  (2001)  do  not  find  any  proof  of  such  trade 
diversion,  but  rather  from  certain  CEECs  towards  other  CEECs.  They  also  argue  against 
relocation and thus, against vertical FDIs: almost half of the FDIs coming from Western 
Europe concern sectors of non-exchangeable goods, mainly public services, communications 
and finance.   5 
More  generally,  considering  the  interdependence  of  the  countries  taking  part  in  the 
process of international economic integration, third country effects on bilateral FDI flows 
cannot be neglected. This was already confirmed by certain studies, which showed that the 
level of FDIs in a country or region also depends on the activity (or FDI level) in nearby 
countries or regions (Head et al., 1999; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; 
Blonigen et al., 2007; Hall and Petroulas, 2008; Y. Chen, 2009). Until today, this generally 
led to a growing number of regional trade or investment agreements, generating a stronger 
FDI  intensity  between  partner  countries:  EU  members  invest  more  in  other  EU  member 
countries than in countries outside the EU; the same is true for Asian economies (UNCTAD, 
2007). This is a proof that not only economic integration leads to more FDIs, but also vice 
versa, FDIs lead to more economic integration. 
Many studies focused on Chinese competition, since its outstanding dynamism could 
lead to FDI diversion from other countries towards China. The conclusions of these studies 
are rather mitigated. It appears that the Chinese FDI inflows have a rather positive impact on 
other Asian countries, as if they were all part a regional production network (Eichengreen and 
Tong, 2007; Chantasasawat et al., 2004), but they have a negative impact on FDIs in some 
OECD countries (Eichengreen and Tong, 2007), Mexico and Colombia (Garcia-Herrero and 
Santabarbara, 2007). Chantasasawat et al. (2004) do not find evidence of FDI diversion in 
absolute terms, but they find some in relative terms: the FDI share in other Asian countries 
and  in  Latin  America  is  negatively  affected  by  Chinese  FDI  inflows.  Lastly,  Fung  et  al. 
(2008) do not find proof for FDI diversion from the CEECs towards China. Jenkins et al. 
(2008) discuss the impact of Chinese growth on FDI and exports of Latin American countries, 
through  an  analysis  of  descriptive  statistics.  They  conclude  that  there  cannot  be  an  FDI 
diversion, since FDIs towards China are primarily vertical, whereas Latin America receives 
rather market-seeking (horizontal FDIs) or resource-seeking FDIs. Lastly, in a more recent 
study, Hanson and Robertson (2008) analyze the impact of Chinese growth on the exports of 
other developing countries specialized in manufacturing and find that it is not significant. 
Lansbury  et  al.  (1996)  show  that  the  CEECs’  openness  led  to  FDI  diversion  from 
Southern  Europe  towards  these  countries.  They  use  an  indicator  of  labour  costs  as  a 
determinant  of  this  FDI  diversion,  this  indicator  being  based  on  a  weighted  average  for 
Southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal). However, their database is quite small: only 
126 observations for FDIs from OECD countries towards Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, over a too short period (1991-1993) to properly take into account the European 
integration of these countries. On the same subject of FDI diversion from Southern Europe   6 
towards the CEECs, Buch et al. (2003) indicate that statistics tend to support this idea, but 
studies based on gravity theory do not confirm it. In their study, they analyze this question 
indirectly, by comparing the level of expected FDIs to the real one in the two groups of 
countries. They conclude that the decrease of FDIs in Southern Europe while FDIs towards 
the CEECs increase does not mean that FDI diversion takes place, but rather that Southern 
European countries are close to their expected FDI level. Altomonte and Guagliano (2001) 
present  an  econometric  study  of  FDI  determinants  in  the  CEECs  and  the  Mediterranean 
countries (MED) and also a study of a possible FDI diversion from the latter towards the 
former, through a descriptive statistics analysis. FDIs in the CEECs are much more important 
today than in the MED. More precisely, FDIs in the CEECs started from very low levels, but 
increased much, especially after the beginning of the negotiations for their adhesion to the 
EU, whereas in the MED, FDIs were higher, but decreased much during the last years. At a 




By analyzing the statistics, even if the developed countries remain the main engine of FDIs 
(outward  as  well  as  inward),  we  cannot  deny  the  increasing  tendency  of  FDIs  towards 
developing  countries  and  the  fact  that  these  countries  become  attractive  locations  for  the 
MNFs, especially during the last decade (Figure 1). In 2006, FDI flows towards developing 
and transition economies reached their highest level: 379 billion dollars (an increase of 21% 
compared to 2005) and 69 billion dollars (an increase of 68%) respectively, whereas the 
number of greenfield investments and expansion investment plans increased by 13%, most of 
them between developing countries (UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
After  the  fall  of  the  Communist  regime  and  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations  for 
adhesion with the EU, among developing countries, the CEECs enjoyed a particularly high 
growth of FDI inflows (Figure 2). A very dynamic phenomenon is also that of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions after the adhesion of 2004: sales almost doubled in Czech Republic, 
from 46 in 2004 to 73 in 2006; in Poland also, they increased from 36 in 2004 to 66 in 2006; 
finally, in Hungary, they more than doubled, getting from 22 to 49 over the same period. 
   7 
Figure 2 here 
 
The countries receiving most FDIs are Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the 
dynamic of the reforms, of the negotiation process of adhesion to the EU and the selected 
privatization policies having a great impact on our ten CEECs’ heterogeneity in terms of 
attracting FDIs (Figure 2). 
The  “laggards”  of  European  integration,  Romania  and  Bulgaria  have  become  the 
favourite destinations since 2004-2005 until the 2008 economic crisis, an improvement very 
clearly visible on the graph above. During the process of adhesion, Bulgaria placed itself 7th 
in 2004-2006 on the scale of the performance index created by the UNCTAD instead of 92nd 
in  1990-1992,  whereas  Romania  ranked  21st  instead  of  101st  during  the  same  periods 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
According to the empirical literature quoted previously, the main assets of the CEECs 
are market potentials, qualified labour, the improvement of the business environment and 
apparently to a lesser extent, the low production costs. Having become almost a trademark 
during the years 1990, the production costs in the CEECs increased: they are today more than 
twice as high as in 1996, at the beginning of their European integration. Nevertheless, they 
remain  very  low  compared  to  the  ones  in  the  older  members  of  the  EU,  the  ratio  being 
approximately 4.5 to 1 in 2006 (Table 1). The lowest costs are obviously found in Romania 
and Bulgaria, the least developed countries of the EU, but which also become increasingly 
attractive FDI destinations. Reading Table 1, except for Slovenia, who stands out of the other 
CEECs thanks to its remarkable performances in terms of reforms and economic stabilization, 
the  countries  receiving  most  FDIs  experienced  the  highest  increase  of  their  labour  costs, 
namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This could be a partial proof of vertical 
FDIs in these countries: the increase in vertical FDIs triggered an increase in labour demand, 
thus contributing to rising labour costs. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The main investors remain Western European countries, the proximity and the long 
lasting cultural bonds being essential for the investment decisions of these countries. At the 
same time, a bonanza (Baldwin et al., 1997) for Western European countries, the CEECs 
represent more than 100 million consumers with rising incomes, some of them having in 2003   8 
a market potential close to that of the Scandinavian countries, such as Slovenia, Hungary, 
Poland, or even that of France, such as the Czech Republic (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
An aspect that was less studied in the empirical literature, but which appears to be 
essential  in  the  theoretical  model  presented  in  Fujita  and  Thisse  (2006)  is  that  of 
communications infrastructures. Globally, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary stand out with the 
most  dynamic  NICT  sector  among  the  CEECs,  especially  thanks  to  a  rapid  privatization 
(Bruce  et  al.,  1999).  More  precisely,  only  three  countries  stand  out  with  a  number  of 
telephone lines rather close to that of the old members of the EU: the Czech Republic comes 
first, then Slovenia and Hungary (Figure 4). Countries like Bulgaria or Romania, which were 
lagging behind in terms of communications, experience notable progress today, especially in 
the mobile sector and especially Bulgaria (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4 here 
Figure 5 here 
 
In terms of FDI diversion involving the CEECs and other parts of the world, we would 
be tempted to think of two main countries/regions. Firstly, we think of Southern Europe, 
because with integration in the EU, the CEECs became obviously the main challengers for 
this area in terms FDI attraction. Secondly, we think of China for several reasons. Firstly, 
analyzing  statistics  over  our  period  of  interest  1996-2003,  China  was  the  3rd  favourite 
destination for FDIs coming from the developed countries retained in our study, right after 
Latin America and the CEECs (Figure 6). China thus represents the first direct challenger for 
the CEECs as a FDI destination. Secondly, we retain only China, because it can be regarded 
as representative for Southeast Asia: China received (over the period 1996-2003) more FDIs 
(from the same investing countries retained in our study) by itself than all the other main FDI 
receivers  in  the  area  (Thailand,  Vietnam,  India)  together  (approximately  56.000  million 
dollars against 46.000 million dollars). Our calculations are based on cumulated FDI inflows 
over the period of interest 1996-2003. 
 
Figure 6 here 
   9 
Lastly, our choice is even more justified by looking at the evolution of FDI flows towards 
China and the CEECs (Figure 7). We can note the almost opposite trends FDIs inflows follow 
in each of them: globally, a FDI decrease towards the CEECs corresponds to a FDI increase 
China and vice versa. Obviously, this does not represent an absolute proof of FDI diversion, 
but seems to support our point of view. 
 
Figure 7 here 
 
II. THE THEORY BEHIND THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The theoretical model is based on Fujita and Thisse (2006)
1 who discuss the relocation of 
industry  triggered  by  differences  in  labour  productivity  and  wages,  in  a  two-region 
framework. It is a classic new economic geography (NEG) model, with the particularity that it 
integrates multinational activity in the industrial sector, multinational firms (MNFs) incurring 
communication  costs  for  separating  their  production  plant  from  their  headquarters,  which 
directly impact production costs. For the sake of space, we let the more interested readers 
refer to Fujita and Thisse (2006) and Vechiu (2010) for a complete description and discussion 
of the model and its enriched version and here we choose only to explain the essence of the 
model and remind the equation of the model our empirical study is based upon. 
In Vechiu (2010), we integrated a third region to the original model discussed by Fujita 
and Thisse (2006), in order to analyze competition effects in terms of attracting FDIs on 
relocation of MNF production units. The originality of our model consists of the definition of 
the three regions: there are one developed region and two developing regions, each one of 
them at a different level of development. This allows a more realistic representation of the 
actual world economy, taking into account the high heterogeneity of countries taking part to 
the process of globalization. The regions are called: the North (N), the South (S) and the Rest 
of the World (RW). The North is the industrialized region, containing all the headquarters of 
multinational firms (headquarters are located in the North and the production unit, in one of 
the two developing regions) and all the national firms (headquarters and the production unit 
are both located in the same region, namely the North), while the South and the Rest of the 
World  are  developing  regions,  containing  only  the  plants  of  the  multinational  firms. 
                                                        
1  A  very  interesting  version  of  this  model  can  be  found  in  Candau  and  Musson  (2010),  dealing  with 
environmental norms and fragmentation of production.   10 
Furthermore, the Rest of the World is assumed less developed than the South, the level of 
development being defined in two manners: productivity and wages of the low skilled labour 
and communication infrastructures. The Rest of the World is more abundant in low skilled 
labour and its wage rate is smaller than that of the South and at the same time, it has a poorer 
communications infrastructure implying higher communication costs. One can think of, for 
instance, Western Europe, South Europe and Eastern and Central Europe, in a multilateral 
framework, or Western Europe, Eastern and Central Europe and China, if we consider that the 
first two are members of a FTA. So, when considering the location of production plants (of 
national and multinational firms), there is a trade off between lower labour costs (wr) and 
communication costs (Cr - subscript r stands for region) in the developing regions: a low 
wage is an incentive to become multinational, as it would reduce production costs, whereas 
communication costs are an incentive to become national, as it would also reduce production 
costs. 
The new that the three-region framework brings as compared to the two-region one is 
the competition effect that appears between the two developing regions. We can say that each 
one of them has an advantage over the other: the Rest of the World challenges the South on a 
wage  basis,  whereas  the  South  challenges  the  Rest  of  the  World  on  a  communications 
infrastructure  basis.  On  this  ground,  a  two-region  model  could  not  a  priori  predict  the 
outcomes  of  economic  integration,  given  that  an  industrial  firm  faces  the  same  trade  off 
between wages and infrastructure in more than one location: the South has higher wages than 
the Rest of the World, but at the same time, it offers a better communications infrastructure; 
the Rest of the World has lower wages than the South, but at the same time, it offers a poorer 
communications infrastructure. 
The rest of the hypothesis are all classic in the NEG literature. There are two production 
factors: the skilled workers and the unskilled workers and two sectors. The manufacturing 
sector  is  under  Dixit-Stiglitz  competition:  each  firm  produces  one  horizontally  different 
variety  under  increasing  returns  to  scale,  using  both  skilled  and  unskilled  workers.  The 
agricultural sector is under perfect competition, using only unskilled labour. Industrial goods 
are subject to “iceberg” trade costs between regions. 
The classic firms’ profit and consumers’ utility maximization gives the equilibrium profit 
functions  in  each  region,  which  allow  analyzing  the  impact  of  globalization  on  industry 
location and welfare (subscripts N, NS and NRW indicate national firms in the North, MNFs 
in the South and MNFs in the Rest of the World respectively):   11 
(1) 
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•     
€ 
γ N = nN / n represents the share of national firms  
•    
€ 
γS = nS / n represents the share of MNFs to the South 
•    
€ 
γRW = nRW / n represents the share of MNFs to the Rest of the World 
•       
€ 
Φrs = τrs
1−σ , freeness of inter-regional trade ( rs = 0 means prohibitive inter-regional trade 
costs,      
€ 
0 < Φrs <1) 
•    
€ 
CRW > CS 
•  Yr – regional income 
•  µ - the share of income spent on industrial goods 
•  σ - the elasticity of substitution between industrial varieties 
•  F – fixed cost 
•  KH – total skilled labour 
•    
€ 
wN
KH – skilled labour wage 
Given the complexity of the equations, results could not be obtained analytically, but 
only through numerical simulations. By varying τrs and Cr, we analyzed the impact of trade 
liberalization (decreasing trade costs τrs), but also information and communication technology 
(decreasing communication costs Cr) on industry relocation (the evolution of γr). We show 
that  industry  relocation  is  influenced  not  only  by  the  wage  and/or  communication  costs 
differential between origin and destination regions, but also by the relative competitiveness of 
the destination region as compared to the other potential destination region. For instance, we 
show that in a multilateral liberalization framework, when wages and communication costs 
are  low  enough  in  the  developing  regions  so  that  multinational  activity  becomes  more   12 
beneficial than the national one, the Rest of the World may lose as well as gain industry, 
depending on its relative competitiveness as compared with the South: if wages in RW are low 
enough to compensate its higher communication costs and thus narrow its competitiveness 
gap with the South, then RW will gain industry at the same time as the South (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 here 
 
Finally, the main conclusion to be retained from the theoretic model is that industrial 
location and multinational activity, as illustrated by the profit function of industrial firms, are 
not  determined  only  by  regions’  characteristics  alone,  but  also  by  their  relative 
competitiveness as compared to their international partners. 
Consequently,  in  the  next  section,  we  will  describe  how  the  econometric  study  is 
derived from the theoretic model and then, we will test it on data for the CEECs. 
 
III. FDIs TOWARDS THE CEECs: DETERMINANTS AND COMPETITION EFFECTS 
 
In this section, an empirical analysis is conducted, based on the linearized operating profit 
function  of  the  MNFs  in  the  previous  section,  together  with  gravity  theory-based 
considerations.  Our  purpose  is  two-folded.  Firstly,  by  examining  profit  functions,  some 
factors determining MNFs location choice can be identified: 
(4)   
€ 
π rs = π rs Yr,Ys,τrs,Cs,ws ( ) 
where r stands for the investing region, s stands for the destination region and the other 
variables have the usual connotation. Secondly, by emphasizing the wage and communication 
costs  differential  between  destination  countries  in  the  profit  functions,  we  can  analyze 
competition effects on FDI decisions (MNFs plants location). 
According to (4), the profit of multinational firms is thus a function of fixed costs, 
regional incomes, trade and communication costs, wages and price indices. Many of these 
variables  represent  quite  a  challenge  as  regards  the  choice  and  the  availability  of  the 
appropriate statistics. Consequently, we follow Head and Mayer (2004) and apply several 
simplifications and transformations in order the get the final estimating equation. 
Firstly, in our model, fixed costs do not affect the location decision, as they are the 
same regardless of the destination region. Thus, we shall use the operating profit function of 
the multinational firms. Considering that the CEECs are developing countries, we shall use   13 
the operating profit for multinational firms given by (2). Using (3) could also be envisaged, as 
the results would be exactly the same. Given that monopolistic profit is 0, then the operating 
profit ( ) becomes: 
(5) 
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Then, following the procedure presented by Head and Mayer (2004), we multiply the 





 and raise the result to the power 1/(1-σ). We thus get a reduced 
form of the operating profit function: 
(6) 
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Finally, we emphasize the wage differential between origin and destination countries, 
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Linearizing (7), we get: 
(8) 
     
€ 







where MP represents Krugman’s market potential, with: 
(9) 
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Krugman’s  market  potential  thus  represents  the  sum  of  the  regional  market  sizes 
(incomes deflated by a reduced form of the price indices) weighted by trade costs. We can 
specify even more the form of the equation to be estimated, by detailing market potentials 
(market sizes x trade costs): 
(10) 
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Regarding  FDI  diversion  triggered  by  countries’  relative  competitiveness,  as  put 
forward by the theoretic model, we shall analyze the impact of destination countries’ relative 
wage and communication costs on FDI inflows.  
The equations to be estimated are derived from (7) by factorizing      
€ 
wRW




for relative wage competitiveness and      
€ 
CRW
1−σ  for relative communication costs competitiveness. 
Finally, using the same reasoning, (10) becomes: 
 (11) 
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Data and methodology 
 
As data on MNFs profits are difficult to find, a usual solution in the NEG empirical analysis 
is to use FDI stocks as a proxy (Mayer, 2006). Consequently, we will use a panel of 60 
bilateral FDI stocks received by ten CEECs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) from 21 developed members of the 
European  Union  and  the  OECD  (Austria,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Italy,  Japan,  South  Korea,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United  States).  Our  annual  data 
come from the OECD database (International direct investment by country Vol 2008 release 
01) and cover the 1996-2003 period. 
Regarding communication costs, we choose the number of fixed and mobile phone lines 
for  100  people  (Cs),  published  by  the  World  Bank.  The  choice  of  these  statistics  seems 
obvious, since the fixed and mobile technology represents one of most important advances of 
the century in terms of information and communications technology. Moreover, other studies 
already highlighted the significant impact of these variables on investment decisions or trade   15 
flows (Fink et al., 2005; Dunning, 2002; Zaheer and Manrakhan, 2001). Our variable will thus 
be  inversely  proportional  to  communication  costs  and  will  measure  the  size  of  the 
communications infrastructure. Consequently, its impact on FDIs should be positive and not 
negative  as  we  would  be  tempted  to  believe  according  to  the  results  of  our  model. 
Furthermore, given that many CEECs have received important FDIs in the communications 
sector, our study could suffer from a potential endogeneity bias. In order to address this issue, 
we  construct  a  dummy  variable  for  communication  costs  (Cdummy),  based  on  the  same 
statistics from the World Bank. The dummy takes value 1 if the number of fixed and mobile 
phone lines per 100 people in a CEEC is higher than the CEECs average and 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, this also allows taking into account the competitiveness of a CEEC relative to 
its neighbours.  
As for wages, we choose as a proxy wages in manufacturing (wr
m, ws
m) from the CEPII 
database  (CEPII  Trade  and  Production  database),  which  we  reconstituted  to  cover  some 
missing observations (2003 for Hungary and Slovenia and all years, except 2002, for Poland,) 
using the quarterly growth rate of the labour costs, posted online by Eurostat. The data are in 
thousands of dollars per annum, for total manufacturing. Several reasons can be mentioned to 
justify this choice. Firstly, for manufacturing industries, low skilled labour is the main input, 
so wages in this type of activity appears suitable enough to be used as a proxy for labour 
costs. Secondly, more and more multinationals relocate their production units towards the 
CEECs, largely known for their competitiveness in manufacturing. Therefore it seems rather 
plausible  that  wages  in  this  field  are  important  determinants  for  FDIs  in  these  countries. 
Lastly, a rather practical reason is that there are no good enough statistics regarding unit 
labour costs. For instance, OECD and Eurostat publish a unit labour costs index, but it does 
not cover all the countries or all years in our sample. 
Lastly, concerning the last part of our equation to be estimated, Head and Mayer (2004) 
use a gravity equation to estimate the market potential (market size and trade costs), whereas 
Mayer (2006) uses as proxies the distance between the investing and destination country for 
trade costs and the GDPs of the investing and destination country for market size. In the 
baseline  estimations,  we  follow  Mayer  (2006)  and  use  as  a  proxy  for  Φ,  the  distance  in 
kilometers between the capital of the investing country and that of the CEEC of destination 
(drs), and for market sizes, the GDPs of the countries of origin and destination (GDPr and 
GDPs). The data on distances come from the CEPII database, whereas the data on GDP come 
from  the  UNCTAD  database.  We  also  proceed  to  a  robustness  check,  using  the  market   16 
potential data (RMPr and RMPs) as estimated by Mayer (2008) and made available online on 
the CEPII website. 
 
Consequently, from (10) and (11) respectively, the baseline equations to be estimated in 
our two studies (FDI determinants and competition effects on FDI decisions) become: 
  FDI determinants: 
(12) LnFDIrs = α1LnGDPr + α2LnGDPs + α3Lndrs + α4LnCs + α5Ln(wr
m/ws
m) + α6β + ε 
  Relative wage and communication costs competition effects: 
(13) LnFDIrs = α1LnGDPr + α2LnGDPs + α3Lndrs + α4Ln(Cs/Cv) + α5Ln(ws
m/wv
m) + α6β + ε 
where r – the investing country and s, v – the receiving countries. 
β is the intercept, which allows taking into account all the other variables that could have an 
impact on FDI, but couldn’t be explicitly integrated in our model and ε - an error term, which 
allows taking into account individuals’ random behavior and measure errors. 
Table 2 hereafter resumes the variables and the proxies chosen, as well as the data 
sources we used in our analysis. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Based on the arguments presented in our Stylized facts sub-section, we choose two main 
challengers for the CEECs in terms of attracting FDIs, namely Southern Europe and China. 
Constructing wage and communication costs for Southern Europe is based on a weighted 
average taking into account Spain and Portugal. The weights correspond to each country’s 
GDP share in region’s total GDP (0.6 for Spain and 0.4 for Portugal) and their evolution is 
small enough for them to be kept constant over the whole period of interest. Greece couldn’t 
be considered in our calculations because the necessary statistics were too scarce. 
Regarding the estimating methods, an empirical investigation could be considered by 
the procedure of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), for each country individually or, by panel 
data  methods  or  the  SUR  method,  collectively.  However  a  panel  data  method  has  the 
advantage of modelling non observed heterogeneity, which is the effect of omitted variables, 
so we choose this one. The SUR method has been avoided, as its implementation involved the 
loss of a considerable numbers of observations.  
In order to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity, we first carried out several 
estimations using the classic panel-data methods: the fixed and random effects models. For   17 
the sake of comparison, we also present OLS estimations. Then, in order to take into account 
the heteroskedasticity generally associated with bilateral FDI data and more generally with 
gravity  equations  (Silva  and  Tenreyro,  2006),  we  conduct  Poisson  Quasi  Maximum 
Likelihood estimations (PQML). 
We will present successively, the results relating to the determinants of FDI stocks in 
the CEECs, particularly those regarding the impact of the communication costs and wage 
differentials and then, the results relating to the potential competition effects between CEECs 
and Southern Europe and CEECs and China in attracting FDIs.    
 
FDI determinants in the CEECs 
 
Table 3 below shows our estimations results using the basic panel methods, while Table 4 
shows the results for PQML estimations. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
In table 3, one can see that mainly all the coefficients are statistically significant at 1% 
and  have  the  expected  sign.  Especially  the  baseline  equations  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  perform 
extremely well. All the coefficients are very robust regardless of the method used: they are 
statistically significant at 1% and their values do not change significantly. As predicted by the 
model and the gravitational theory more generally, the GDPs of the countries of origin and 
destination  have  a  positive  impact  on  bilateral  FDI  stocks,  the  GDP  of  the  country  of 
destination being estimated approximately twice more important than the GDP of the country 
of origin in FDI decisions. Then, trade costs approximated by the distance between partner 
countries have a negative impact on bilateral FDI stocks, a standard outcome in this kind of 
analysis, while the size of the communications infrastructure is positive, thus reflecting the 
negative impact of communication costs (the more people have access to a telephone line, the 
better the communication infrastructure and thus, the lower the communication costs and the 
higher the FDI stocks). Lastly, the wage differential is also very significant and has a positive 
impact on bilateral FDIs, although, it seems to be the least important among the other decision 
criteria.  Consequently,  the  lower  the  wages  in  the  CEECs  as  compared  to  those  of  the 
investing countries, the more FDIs towards the CEECs. The coefficient is positive because we 
considered the difference in wages between the investing country and the receiving country.   18 
Replacing the proxy for communication costs in the baseline equation ((7), (8) and (9)) 
doesn’t  alter  the  results  we  have  discussed  previously.  Communications  infrastructure 
continues to appear more important than wages in FDI decisions, but globally the coefficients 
for the two variables are much lower than in the baseline estimation. 
Finally,  when  considering  Mayer’s  (2008)  market  potential  instead  of  GDPs  and 
distance as a proxy for market potential, we get approximately the same results, with the 
difference that wages appear more important than communications infrastructure ((4), (5), (6), 
(10), (11) and (12)) and the dummy used for the latter has a negative impact on FDIs towards 
the CEECs ((10), (11) and (12)). The importance of wages when using RMP instead of GDP 
could be easily explained by the construction of the RMP. The RMP is a much wider concept 
than the GDP: while the GDP reflects only the importance of the local market, the RMP 
reflects both the importance of the local market and the access to the foreign markets from the 
local market. Consequently, the wage becomes a much more important decision criterion for a 
MNF wishing to serve both local and foreign markets from the same location than for a MNF 
wishing to serve only the local market by establishing a local production unit. Finally, the 
negative impact of the communications dummy in the last three columns of table 3 could also 
be explained by the fact that the construction of the RMP itself is based on many dummy 
variables. When considering trade costs, the RMP takes into account not only distance, but 
also  different  dummy  variables  capturing  factors  such  as  contiguity,  common  language, 
colonial links and being part of a free trade agreement, a currency union or GATT/WTO 
(Mayer, 2008). Alternatively, one must notice the very high coefficient of the RMP, which 
combined with an also high coefficient for the wage differential, suggests a substantial proof 
for vertical FDIs in the CEECs. Generally, vertical or efficiency-seeking FDIs are looking for 
low production costs and a good access to foreign markets from the local market where the 
FDI  is  undertaken.  Thus,  if  we  think  of  communications  infrastructure  as  a  signal  for  a 
country’s  level  of  development,  it  shouldn’t  come  as  a  surprise  that  a  higher  level  of 
development means also higher global production costs and consequently, less efficiency-
seeking FDIs. Lastly, this could also be interpreted in the light of the model presented Martin 
and  Rogers  (1995):  improving  the  international  infrastructure  of  a  country  (connecting  a 
peripheral  country  to  a  core  country)  may  lead  to  capital  leaving  the  country  instead  of 
coming to the country, whereas improving local infrastructure (connecting local agents inside 
a peripheral country) may have the opposite outcome. 
In table 4 below, the coefficients have globally lower values. As already explained by 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the PQML method shows how much standard methods such as   19 
OLS or fixed and random effects may overestimate the value of the estimated coefficients, by 
ignoring keteroskedasticity inherent to gravity equations. Nevertheless our variables remain 
very significant and have the usual sign, except for the communication costs dummy, which 
becomes non significant when considering RMPs instead of GDPs and distance as a proxy or 
countries’ market potentials. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Competing for FDIs: CEECs versus Southern Europe and China  
 
Implementing relative labour and communication costs considerations as shown by (13), we 
were able to test for some competition effects between destination countries, such as predicted 
by our model. As aforementioned, we choose to test the impact of Southern European (SE) 
and also Chinese relative competitiveness. We proceed to the same robustness check, by 
using  also  RMPs  instead  of  GDPs  and  distance,  but  we  don’t  take  into  account  any 
communication  costs  dummy.  Given  that  we  use  only  relative  communication  costs  the 
problem of FDIs endogeneity does not stand anymore as global FDIs towards a CEEC are not 
very likely to have an impact on the communication costs differential between that CEEC and 
some potential competitor in particular. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, when checking the impact of SE-CEECs 
relative  labour  and  communication  costs,  we  ignore  CEECs  labour  costs  relative  to  the 
investing  countries  and  CEECs  communication  costs.  Consequently,  in  (13),  s  and  v 
subscripts  are  replaced  by  SE  and  CEEC  subscripts  respectively  and  relate  to  Southern 
European variables and CEECs variables respectively.  
Table 5 below presents the estimations results for the impact of the CEECs-SE relative 
wage and communication costs. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
One  can  see  that  general  gravity  theory-based  considerations  are  confirmed.  This 
analysis thus confirms some of the results found in the previous analysis: traditional market 
related factors and distance have a very significant and correctly signed impact on FDIs in the 
CEECs, the coefficients being quite robust when using standard panel methods, but with 
lower values when using PQML.    20 
We  find  rather  weak  evidence  for  wage  competition  effects.  The  wage  differential 
between Southern Europe and the CEECs becomes significant only in equations using GDPs 
((2), (3)) and/or estimations using PQML ((7), (8)). As for communications infrastructure 
competition  effects,  the  coefficients  are  very  significant,  even  though  they  change  sign 
depending on the variable being used as a proxy for market potential. This pattern is similar to 
the one found in our previous analysis of FDI determinants, when we were considering the 
communication  costs  dummy.  Consequently,  when  considering  a  more  efficiency-seeking 
vision for FDIs towards a CEEC, having a relatively poorer communications infrastructure 
than other potential destination countries may still have a positive impact on FDIs entering the 
CEECs. In this particular case, when we consider the impact of the RMP on FDIs towards the 
CEECs ((3), (4), (5) and (8)), which is very strong and positive, we can conclude that having 
a good access to foreign markets is very beneficial for FDIs in these countries. But having a 
good access to foreign markets also means having good access to their better infrastructure. 
We can thus conclude that the CEECs with a good access to foreign markets (among which 
Southern  Europe)  also  have  a  good  access  to  their  relatively  better  communication 
infrastructure (in our case, Southern Europe) and thus, may enjoy more export platform FDIs. 
Finally, table 6 below presents the results for Chinese competition effects. The results 
are  very  similar  to  the  ones  regarding  Southern  Europe  competition  effects,  with  the 
difference that evidence for some wage competition effects is now even weaker. Also one can 
notice that together with standard results being confirmed (very strong and significant impact 
of market-related factors), the Chinese communications infrastructure competition effect is as 
important as the Southern European one. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
To sum up, as predicted by the theoretic model, some competition effects do appear 
between developing countries with regard to attracting FDIs. One of the main sources of 
competition  today  is  assumed  to  be  the  low  labour  cost,  even  though  some  developing 
countries have succeeded in specializing in high value added sectors, based on more capital 
intensive goods. However, our analysis supports the idea that wage competition effects are 
rather weak in the CEECs. Actually, a far more important source of competition effects is 
adopting the latest communication and information technology, in order to attract MNFs. 
 





Based on the main conclusions of a theoretical model, we analyzed FDI determinants 
and competition effects in terms of attracting FDIs in the CEECs. Our empirical analysis 
contributed to the existing literature at least in two ways: on the one hand, we estimated FDIs 
determinants  based  on  a  formal  model  and  on  the  other  hand,  we  used  the  latest  data 
available. Trade and communication costs together with labour costs seem to have a strong 
impact  on  inward  FDIs  in  these  countries.  Their  inward  FDIs  are  positively  related  to 
adopting communication technology and negatively related to trade and labours costs. The 
usual  market-related  determinants  are  also  confirmed:  FDIs  in  the  CEECs  are  positively 
related to their GDP or, in a wider view, to their real market potential. As for competition 
effects between developing countries in attracting FDIs, it seems that FDIs in the CEECs are 
hindered  by  the  relatively  better  communication  infrastructure  in  Southern  Europe  when 
taking into account only local market considerations, but enhanced by it when considering 
both local and foreign market access considerations. We found the same competition effects 
when considering China instead of Southern Europe. Finally, we found rather weak evidence 
for wage competition effects between Southern Europe and the CEECs and even weaker 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 
LABOUR COSTS INDEX IN MANUFACTURING 
Year 
Country  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
EU15  2763.2  2895.5  2987.9  3102.7  3265.1  3245.5  3351.2  3490.1  3670  3814.6  3718.4    
Bulgaria              167.6  172.7  177.3  183.7  192.5  205.5  217.3  253.6 
Estonia  257.3  299.3  339.5  357.7  400.8  447.1  499.3  539.8  584.5  656.7  769.1    
Hungary  380.5  415  434.1  460.6  524.1  587.6  696.4  720.7  799.9  908.4  890.3  993.6 
Latvia     244  255.4  275.9  316.9  325.1  330  326.9  354.2  395.2  483.8  625.4 
Lithuania  179.2  249.1  284.5  318.9  373.5  409.5  434.5  450.4  458.7  501.3  583.3  719.4 
Poland  399.3  458.2  500  534.1  599.1  694.1  681.7  612.4  607.3  716.3  785  886.3 
Czech Rep.  384.6  412.4  453.1  472.1  531.7  594.6  701  713.2  767.1  853.1  944.7  1036.5 
Romania  145.3  137.2  166.7  156.2  191.5  209.4  217  212.2  239.5  308.5  358.2  450.7 
Slovakia  310.2  373.7  390.2  364.2  425.8  442.7  485.3  532.6  618  662.7  729.4  883 
Slovenia  944.3  1014.1  1105.5  1158.5  1165.5  1207.3  1304.8  1352.6  1376.5  1454.9  1513.8  1617 
CEECs  397.7  441.5  479  506.3  567  641.6  678.9  659.8  685.2  777.9  840.1  931.1 
Data source: EUROSTAT, 2009   27 
TABLE 2 
CHOICE OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable  Proxy  Data source 
  
€ 










  Receiving country’s GDP GDPs  UNCTAD 
MPr  Head and Mayer (2004) Real market potential RMPr  CEPII 
MPs  Head and Mayer (2004) Real market potential RMPs  CEPII 
  
€ 
Φrs  Distance en km between capitals of investing and 
receiving countries drs  CEPII 
Cs 
Number of fixed and mobile lines subscribers per 100 





m  Wage in manufacturing   CEPII 
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TABLE 4 











LnGDPr  0.571***  0.601***     
  (0.0443)  (0.0439)     
LnGDPs  1.199***  1.157***     
  (0.0359)  (0.0307)     
Lndrs  -0.619***  -0.685***     
  (0.0503)  (0.0435)     
LnRMPr      0.386***  0.382*** 
      (0.0505)  (0.0509) 
LnRMPs      2.165***  2.127*** 
      (0.151)  (0.155) 




m)  0.656***  0.387***  0.762***  0.772*** 
  (0.0674)  (0.0484)  (0.107)  (0.106) 
LnCs  1.915***    -0.147   
  (0.137)    (0.136)   
Cdummy    0.989***    -0.0166 
    (0.0782)    (0.0714) 
Observations  403  403  403  403 




*) the null-hypothesis is rejected at 1% (5%, 10%), (.) is the standard error 
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TABLE 5 




















LnGDPr  1.07***  1.07***  1.07***        0.653***   
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)        (0.0282)   
LnGDPs  1.47***  1.56***  1.55***        1.048***   
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)        (0.0513)   
Lndrs  -1.55***  -1.58***  -1.58***        -0.691***   
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)        (0.0403)   
LnRMPr        1.250***  1.245***  1.250***    0.529*** 
        (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)    (0.0428) 
LnRMPs        2.109***  2.049***  2.104***    1.343*** 
        (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.28)    (0.186) 




m )  0.03  0.40*  0.34*  -0.379  -0.397  -0.380  0.230***  -0.300*** 
  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.0724)  (0.0874) 
Ln(CSE/CCEEC)  -0.78***  -1.03***  -0.99***  0.826**  0.989***  0.844**  -1.543***  0.236** 
  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.136)  (0.105) 
Intercept  -23.88***    -25.58***  -43.33***  -42.36***  -43.24***     
  (2.31)    (2.38)  (5.26)  (5.51)  (5.28)     
Observations  473  473  473  473  473  473  478  478 
R-squared  0.68  0.71  0.71  0.42  0.39  0.42     




*) the null-hypothesis is rejected at 1% (5%, 10%), (.) is the standard error 
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TABLE 6 




















LnGDPr  1.05***  1.07***  1.07***        0.653***   
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)        (0.0282)   
LnGDPs  1.28***  1.56***  1.52***        1.048***   
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)        (0.0513)   
Lndrs  -1.63***  -1.58***  -1.59***        -0.691***   
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)        (0.0403)   
LnRMPr        1.22***  1.25***  1.22***    0.529*** 
        (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)    (0.0428) 
LnRMPs        1.96***  2.05***  1.96***    1.343*** 
        (0.27)  (0.30)  (0.27)    (0.186) 




m )  0.20  -0.40*  -0.32  0.42  0.40  0.42  -0.230***  0.300*** 
  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.0724)  (0.0874) 
Ln(CCEEC/CCHN)  -0.69***  1.03***  0.80***  -0.95***  -0.99***  -0.95***  1.543***  -0.236** 
  (0.27)  (0.37)  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.136)  (0.105) 
Intercept  -19.55***    -25.67***  -40.07***  -41.73***  -40.07***     
  (2.34)    (2.43)  (4.55)  (5.02)  (4.55)     
Observations  473  473  473  473  473  473  478  478 
R-squared  0.67  0.71  0.71  0.42  0.39  0.42     




*) the null-hypothesis is rejected at 1% (5%, 10%), (.) is the standard error 
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FIGURES 
Data source: UNCTAD, million dollars 









Data source: World Bank, million dollars 
FIGURE 2. FDI inflows in the CEECs. 
   34 
 
Data source: CEPII 
FIGURE 3. Head et Mayer (2004) market potential in 2003.  
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Data source: World Bank 
FIGURE 4. Communications infrastructure in 2003: the number of fixed and mobile 
subscribers per 100 persons. 
















Data source: World Bank 
FIGURE 5. The penetration rate of communication technologies in Bulgaria and Romania: 
the number of mobile subscribers per 100 persons. 
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Source: OECD, author’s calculation 
FIGURE 6. OECD FDIs by destination. 
















Source: OECD, million dollars, author’s calculation 
FIGURE 7. The evolution of FDI inflows: China versus the CEECs. 
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(a)              (b) 
FIGURE 8. The impact of multilateral trade liberalization on the distribution of industry in a 
context of low communication costs and wages: (a) a small competitiveness differential 
between the developing regions; (b) a high competitiveness differential between the 
developing regions. 
 